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Abstract 
 
Clarifying Pokhran-II in a Multilinguistic Setting 
 
Hunter Andrew Gallacher, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
 
Supervisor:  Donald Davis 
 
In May of 1998, India conducted its second nuclear test after a period of 24 years. This second 
test, known as Pokhran-II, caught the world by surprise and 17 days later it was followed by Pakistan’s 
first test of a nuclear device. The international community sought clarification for these developments 
and Indian and Pakistani leaders issued messages to explain their respective country’s rationale for 
testing. This report, focusing on the statements of then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, 
argues that India’s motivations for testing can only be fully understood through consultation with both 
English and Hindi language statements. Four established models that explain why nations develop and 
test nuclear weapons are used to parse these sources to determine the contrast of rationale between each 
language.  These models – gaining “security” from external threat, the interests of “domestic politics”, 
nuclear weapons as one of the “norms” indicating modernity, and the centering of victimhood and 
entitlement in “post-imperial ideology” – are variously represented across the statements. This displays 
that the complete picture of why the tests were conducted only can be seen by studying statements made 
in both languages. The implications of these findings suggest that attempts to clarify events that 
originate in multilinguistic settings should be made via consultation with sources in all of the languages 
that constitute the setting of the original event. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
BACKGROUND 
May of 1998 was a pivotal time for both Indo-Pak and Indo-U.S. relations. In the 
span of 17 days, both India and Pakistan would conduct nuclear tests, putting the world on 
edge and creating mixed feelings within domestic and international spheres. There was an 
acute understanding that these tests would have repercussions with both domestic and 
international audiences. Euphoria was the dominant feeling in the publics of both 
countries1, 2 but international reaction was less welcoming. U.S. President Bill Clinton 
remarked that the test “threatens the stability of Asia” and that it “tested the firm 
international consensus to stop all nuclear testing”.3 Indian and Pakistani political leaders 
recognized that statements were necessary and issued them accordingly. In the case of 
India, many of its leaders made statements in both English and Hindi. For key players, 
including the Clinton Administration, trying to gain clarification of the rationale and 
implications of the tests was crucial to their attempts to counter further nuclear 
proliferation. 
                                                
1 Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb (London: Zed Books, 1998), 1. 
2 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2012), 282. 
3 Bill Clinton, "Commencement Address at the United States Naval Academy" (address, Annapolis, MD, 
May 22, 1998). 
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PURPOSE  
This report represents a probative study into addressing a single event, the 1998 
Pokhran-II nuclear tests in India. This event occurred in a multilinguistic setting but was 
commonly comprehended by audiences in mono-linguistic settings. The inferences from 
this specific event are much wider as this phenomenon happens continuously. In short, an 
event occurs in one place and is understood and framed through the linguistic setting of 
first-hand observers. Next, that event is transmitted, often after acts of internal or 
anonymous4 translation, to recipients who then engage with it in their own, often different 
linguistic tradition. This movement across linguistic settings provides fertile ground for the 
reshaping of emphasis, emotion, and depth.  Using the 1998 nuclear tests at Pokhran, this 
report argues that the most comprehensive understanding of that event only comes through 
consultation of both English and Hindi language statements and that this provides insight 
for clarifying similar events in the future. To accomplish this, the rationale for testing 
revealed in these statements will be evaluated against four established “models” of 
compulsion that motivate states to develop and test nuclear weapons.  
TOPIC SELECTION, LENS, AND FOCUS 
 Using the topic of nuclear proliferation and weapons development as the milieu for 
study is both an advantage and a challenge. The amount of work dedicated to the topic is 
substantial in the fields of security studies and international relations. The challenge is to 
navigate an inherently complicated topic and to produce something that qualitatively adds 
                                                
4 For more on the anonymity and lack of prestige bestowed on Hindi-English translators see Sujit 
Mukerjee, Translation as Discovery (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Private Limited, 1981), 135. 
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to the issue rather than simply increasing the quantity of available literature. That stated, 
this report is not primarily about nuclear proliferation, rather its central focus is the 
complementary processes of communicating and understanding. Nuclear weapons testing 
only serves as a backdrop for this line of study. It is a useful backdrop as there is an 
increased sense that messaging matters even more during such intense times.  
 This specific case is valuable because it has spawned many theories on why India’s 
government decided to test the bomb. A mainstream theory on why nations build nuclear 
weapons was developed by Scott Sagan. His analysis5 centers around three “models”, 
namely security, domestic politics, and norms.6 Another model that builds on Sagan’s three 
models is the idea of post-imperial ideology as posited by Manjari Chatterjee Miller. She 
considers that this ideology, which is constituted by victimhood and entitlement, is the 
major influence that compelled India to test.7  Both these understandings of why nuclear 
weapons are developed and the four models that comprise them will be used to classify the 
language to be analyzed.  
 Rather than look at a wide variety of speakers, this report focuses on the output of 
one person in particular, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Indian Prime Minister at the time of the 
Pokhran-II8 tests. He was chosen for this report for two reasons. First, there is a substantial 
amount of available information on his language production related to the test. Transcripts 
and even videos of speeches on the topic are readily available in government archives and 
on the internet. Second, he can be directly connected to this major event that resulted in 
                                                
5 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” 
International Security 21, no. 3 (1996-1997): 54-86. 
6 Manjari Chatterjee Miller, Wronged by Empire: Post Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and 
China, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 87-92. 
7 Ibid, 92. 
8 The operation name for these tests was Operation Shakti which means power. For the duration of the 
report it will be referred to as Pokhran-II. 
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him clarifying his and his country’s position. It has been noted that very few individuals 
were involved in the decision to test9 and so choosing one with such intimate knowledge 
and the authority to ultimately approve the action was essential.  
There is existing literature about Prime Minister Vajpayee and nuclear testing and 
it often falls into categories such as hagiography, political science, or cultural studies. 
There are works that both critique him and the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) decision to 
test10 as well as others that credit him as a visionary leader for testing.11  All have been 
considered; however, most weight has been given to works of strategic studies that treat 
Pokhran-II as a historical event. A desire to go “beyond the disciplinary confines of 
strategic studies” has been espoused by Haider K. Nizamani in his book, The Roots of 
Rhetoric. Unfortunately, this report does not go much beyond the boundaries of security 
studies but rather offers a mild departure from its typical focus. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Looking into topics related to nuclear weapons programs is often fraught with 
issues. Itty Abraham discusses the challenges he faced when he wrote The Making of the 
Indian Nuclear Bomb, and surmised that due to matters of official secrecy he would work 
only with public sources.12 This precedent will be followed again here as only unclassified 
material has been considered.  
                                                
9 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact of Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999), 416. 
10 See N. Ram, Riding the Nuclear Tiger (New Delhi: LeftWord Books, 1999). 
11 See M.L. Sondhi and Prakash Nanda, Vajpayee’s Foreign Policy: Daring the Irreversible, (New Delhi: 
Har-Anand Publications, 1999), 26-36. 
12 Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb, 4. 
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It should also be conceded that this work is situated in American discourse on 
nuclear weapons and issues related to Hindi-English. The author is limited to English 
language sources, thereby presenting an occasion for bias.  
APPROACH TO HINDI AND ENGLISH 
This report will present evidence from primary sources in both English and Hindi. 
These documents, including press releases, debate transcripts, and letters, will be included 
as figures and quotes when appropriate. The author does not assume that the reader has any 
knowledge of Hindi and will provide translations via footnote any time that language is 
utilized. Also, these sources are cited in their original form and include some uncorrected 
misspellings in both languages.  
OMISSIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS 
Comprehensive works exist on the history of the nuclear weapons programs of both 
India and Pakistan. In particular, George Perkovich’s India’s Nuclear Bomb and Brigadier 
Feroz Hassan Khan’s Eating Grass excel as members of this genre. Both were consulted 
heavily in the construction of this report.  Here the aim is only a brief summary of those 
histories only to set the stage for testing and subsequent language production. These 
histories are also filled with multiple characters such as Homi J. Bhabha, A.Q. Khan and 
others who are infamous for their contributions. While they make ideal subjects for study 
at the confluence of strategic studies and linguistic communication their stories are not 
found in this work.  
Another issue not deeply explored in this report is the scientific basis on which 
nuclear weapons work. That stated, a basic understanding of the nuclear fuel cycle and 
strategies for weapon construction and employment makes further study of proliferation 
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more efficient.13  Knowledge of the science informs discourse on nuclear weapons and 
their proliferation and was vital in the construction of this report.  
It is also important to note that this writing does not seek to make any type of value 
judgement on the decision to test, the Indian nuclear weapons program, or nuclear weapons 
in general. India’s first nuclear test occurred over 43 years ago at the time of this writing. 
It is by now more of a historical reality than a debatable exigency.  
THE WAY FORWARD 
This report is organized into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the overall 
report and lays out relevant qualifications and constraints for its construction. Chapter Two 
provides an overview of proliferation history as well as the discourse that surrounded its 
evolution. Starting with the advent of the American nuclear weapons program during 
World War II and terminating with the decision to test at Pokhran in 1998, the chapter will 
rely heavily on works of political history and security studies. This chapter also provides 
the context for the environment in which the Pokhran-II decision was made. Chapter Three 
commences with the test itself and the immediate dispersion of English language 
statements explaining the event. Four sources in particular will be addressed - the Prime 
Minister’s statement to the press on May 11th, 1998; the official press statement of the 
Ministry of External Affairs dated May 11th; Prime Minister Vajpayee’s letter to President 
Clinton as published by the New York Times on May 13th; and finally, his statement before 
the Lok Sabha14 on May 27th. The prominent messages and the rationales they reveal in 
terms of testing will be identified and discussed. Chapter Four will turn to communications 
made in Hindi by Prime Minister Vajpayee in the Lok Sabha. Prominent will be his 
                                                
13 For an extensive presentation on this topic from the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School see 
Matthew Bunn, "Nuclear 101: How Nuclear Bombs Work" (lecture), September 10, 2013.  
14 The lower house of India’s parliament.  
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response during a debate in parliament on May 29th, 1998 as well as comments made in 
the same house nearly a year later on April 17th, 1999. These comments will reveal the 
compulsions, motivations, and criticisms he negotiated at home and abroad through 
domestic dialogue. Chapter Five will introduce one more piece of evidence, the transcript 
of a 2005 speech from the then former Prime Minister Vajpayee. Here, on the 8th 
anniversary of the Pokhran-II, he reflects upon the tests and provides more context on why 
they were conducted.  This chapter will finish with a summary of the evidence, a 
conclusion, and a recommendation.  
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Chapter Two: Up to the Test 
Figure 1: A Comment from P.M. Vajpayee on April 17th, 199915 
 
 
HISTORY AND THE RELEVANT DISCOURSE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
 The compulsions facing Indian leadership in 1998 were not isolated nor were they 
the product of a singular person or movement. Rather, they were representative of the 
evolution of all conceptions about nuclear weapons since their initial emergence less than 
sixty years earlier. The above statement from Prime Minister Vajpayee illustrates this 
intersection of global nukespeak16 and India’s existential challenges. In order to properly 
frame the messaging surrounding Pokhran-II a summary of relevant thought developments 
must be consulted. A chronological synopsis of those transformations is presented below. 
THE BIRTH OF THE NUCLEAR AGE 
The nuclear age grew out of the shadow of the Second World War. The United 
States, with support from the United Kingdom and Canada, is well known for developing 
the atomic bomb and for subsequently employing it against Japan in the closing days of 
the conflict. The discourse of this time is unique as it initially developed from concerns 
over an adversary obtaining the as yet unproven technology. This sentiment will be later 
echoed in the narratives of both India and Pakistan. In this case, the Americans and the 
                                                
15 “There should be a minimum deterrent. It should also be credible, therefore the decision to test was 
done.”  
16 For the origins of this term that illustrates the nuclear mindset see Stephen Hilgartner, Richard C. Bell, 
and Rory O’Connor, Nukespeak: The Selling of Nuclear Technology in America, (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1982).  
Ê¨ÉÊxÉ¨É¨É Êb÷]õ®úäÆ]õ ½þÉäxÉÉ SÉÉÊ½þB* ´É½þ FòäÊb÷¤É±É ¦ÉÒ 
½þÉäxÉÉ SÉÉÊ½þB, <ºÉÒÊ±ÉB {É®úÒIÉhÉ EòÉ ¡òèºÉ±ÉÉ ÊEòªÉÉ 
MÉªÉÉ  
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British were concerned that Nazi Germany would weaponize the atom first.17 The final 
decision to actually employ an atomic weapon was conceived in the context of the 
battlefield situation in the Pacific Theatre of 1945. The bomb was considered by many to 
be a psychological weapon that could be used to induce surprise, shock and thus 
unconditional surrender.18 There was debate as to whether the bomb could simply be 
demonstrated, rather than employed against the enemy, to induce these results.19 In order 
to achieve maximum shock, the United States chose to employ the atomic bomb against 
the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki which resulted in an unprecedented loss of 
human life and physical destruction. The attack also resulted in Japan submitting to 
American demands for unconditional surrender which seemingly confirmed pre-attack 
discourse on the meaning of such weapons.20 It is important to note that this first use of the 
bomb was a unique case. First, this technology would never again induce such complete 
surprise as the world became aware of this deadly armament. Issues relating to 
employment, control, and enemy response would be profoundly different in the future as 
this first use of the bomb occurred at the end of an already devastating war. The Japanese 
had limited capability to defend against aerial attacks, had almost no expectation of atomic 
attack, and no possibility of responding with corresponding weaponry. After Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, any discourse dependent on complete surprise would no longer be valid. 
Knowledge of the bomb made everything different.  
                                                
17 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 15. 
18 Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 17-18. 
19 Ibid 18. 
20 Ibid, 18-19. Note: the impact of the Soviet Union declaring war against Japan also played a role in the 
decision to surrender, the relative weight of the atomic bomb attacks and Soviet participation is a subject of 
historical debate.  
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EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR DOCTRINE IN THE FIRST PART OF THE COLD WAR 
The end of World War II brought the globe into a new era that is often referred to 
as the Atomic Age. It also brought the advent of the Cold War, a geopolitical conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet Union and both state’s allies, partners, and 
satellites. From 1945, the United States maintained its monopoly on the tools of nuclear 
war and this continued to inform strategy. President Truman maintained civilian control 
over the nuclear weapons and pursued the first effort towards disarmament under the 1946 
Baruch Plan.21  In 1949 the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic device thus marking the 
end of American monopoly on this method of destruction. This led to new ways of thinking 
about nuclear weapons that would persist through the testing of 1998.  
A key concept that comes from this period that informs the decision environment 
of 1998 is the idea of a nuclear deterrent based on assured destruction. Assured destruction 
is built on the idea that an adversary would be dissuaded from aggressive action due to the 
risk of having a major portion of its population and industry destroyed in a nuclear attack.22 
Another aspect of this policy was its fiscal nature, the argument being that possession of 
nuclear weapons allowed a nation to spend less money to achieve security vis-à-vis paying 
for a large conventional force.23 This economic factor has direct influence on later Pakistani 
and Indian thinking about developing the bomb.  
EUROPEAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS 
Two nations that previously maintained colonies in India have become declared 
nuclear states. The United Kingdom, as indicated earlier, had been involved with the 
American project to develop weapons during World War II. In fact, in 1940 they were the 
                                                
21 Amos A. Jordan et al., American National Security (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2009), 349. 
22 Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 11.  
23 Ibid, 78. 
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first country to identify the necessity of acquiring nuclear weapons.24  After the war and 
the American decision to prohibit nuclear cooperation with foreign countries25, the British 
chose to pursue an independent program and conducted their first nuclear test in 1952. The 
compulsions facing the British were simultaneous desires for independent capability and 
alternatively a resumption of cooperation with the American program.  Past of its 
development plans hinged on showing “that it had something to offer” the Americans.26 In 
1958, the United States resumed cooperation with the United Kingdom on matters of 
nuclear defense.27 In short, testing had not brought punishment or condemnation, rather it 
facilitated the resumption of cooperation.  
France on the other hand had not cooperated with the United States on nuclear 
weapons during the Second World War but soon found itself part of the American led Cold 
War alliance. The French decision to develop its own program was built out of an aversion 
to dependence on the United States for nuclear protection.28 In 1960 France conducted its 
first nuclear test, an atmospheric test which was conducted in Algeria. This test was 
protested by the developing world and the Soviet bloc as an act of “environmental 
colonialism and vandalism” as it was an atmospheric test conducted in one of France’s 
overseas territories.29 American and British reaction to the tests was muted, the Americans 
attempted to balance between not upsetting developing nations and maintaining its alliance 
                                                
24 John Baylis and Kristan Stoddart, “The British Nuclear Experience: The Role of Ideas and Beliefs (Part 
One),” Diplomacy & Statecraft 23, no.2 (2012): 332-33. 
25 This prohibition came via the McMahon Act see Baylis and Stoddart, “The British Nuclear Experience,” 
335.  
26 Ibid, 340.  
27 Ibid, 341-42. 
28 Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 321. 
29 Mervyn O’Driscoll, “Explosive Challenge: Diplomatic Triangles, the United Nations, and the Problem 
of French Nuclear Testing, 1959–1960,” Journal of Cold War Studies 11, (2009), 28.  
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with the French.30 Regardless, the test was conducted and France escaped major 
condemnation or punishment from the major powers.  
INDIAN LEADERSHIP AND TEST BAN TREATIES 
Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of independent India, is credited as being 
the first to propose halts to nuclear testing. He appealed to the United Nations with this call 
in 1954 and the notions it proposed set the “moral tone” for India for years to come.31  He 
was publicly against the spread of weapons but held deep interest in what atomic energy 
could do for India.32 
Proclaiming Prime Minister Nehru as having been defiantly against the 
development of nuclear weapons for India has been challenged.33 He gave scientist Homi 
J. Bhabha significant autonomy in developing India’s nuclear capabilities which included 
full domestic control of the fuel cycle makes the creation of a bomb possible. Nehru, for 
his part laid the “necessary foundations” for India to develop weapons at a later time.34  
Nehru’s actions show a “duality and ambiguity”35 of discourse that will be seen later in 
comments from Prime Minister Vajpayee.  
A concrete success that was in line with the visions of Prime Minister Nehru is the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). Coming into force in October of 1963 and ultimately 
signed by over 100 nations, it represented a positive move for the environment as it 
prohibited nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space, and underwater.36 It does not 
                                                
30 Ibid, 53-54. 
31 David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, "Indian Public Opinion," in India and the Bomb, ed. David 
Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 6-10. 
32 Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II, The Prospects and Sources of New Dehli’s Nuclear 
Weapons Program,” International Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 150.  
33 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 14-15. 
34 Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II,” 151. 
35 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 14. 
36 For text of the the treaty see “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space 
and Under Water,” accessed October 11, 2017, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/test_ban/text. 
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however prohibit conducting contained tests underground. From the first tests conducted 
in 1945 until this treaty went to effect, the quantity of dangerous isotopes in the atmosphere 
increased radically. Since the inception of the PTBT, the quantity of these isotopes has 
dramatically declined.37  
Greater attempts to achieve Nehru’s visions of complete bans on testing and 
eventual disarmament have also continued across the globe. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) represent international 
attempts at halting both the spread and testing of nuclear weapons. Unlike the PTBT, these 
agreements have not been signed by India. The NPT, which came into force in 1970, was 
rejected as it required non-nuclear states to remain so, yet allowed nuclear states to continue 
without any hard requirements to dismantle their atomic arsenals.38 Signing the NPT would 
have closed off the option to eventually test its own weapons. The CTBT, which came into 
force in September of 1996 was initially supported by India but eventually rejected due to 
considerations of national security, domestic pressure, and what was viewed as the 
continuing hypocrisy of nuclear states not disarming themselves.39 To date neither India 
nor Pakistan has signed either treaty.  
NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN CHINA 
The entrance of a new nuclear weapons country has been and will likely remain a 
significant event. For India, the fifth entrant to the nuclear club posed very immediate 
challenges. China conducted its first test in October of 1964, two years after fighting a 
border war with India. The test prompted heavy discussion inside India about the effects 
                                                
37 “The Technical Details: The Bomb Spike: Nuclear Testing and Its Own Fingerprint,” accessed October 
11, 2017, https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/outreach/isotopes/bombspike.html 
38 See “IAEA Information Circular: Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons,” accessed 
November 4, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/treaty-non-proliferation-nuclear-
weapons 
39 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 378-84. 
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on national security if they did not develop their own bomb.40 This led to two 
developments: India would seek security guarantees from nuclear states as a hedge against 
China; and India would thereafter see a potential nuclear threat in its neighborhood.41 
SMILING BUDDHA 
Pokhran-II was not India’s first nuclear test. The first test, also conducted at 
Pokhran, was carried out on May 18th, 1974 under approval from then Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi. This detonation of a single device was deemed a “peaceful nuclear 
explosion” by its architects and was given the name “Smiling Buddha”. The blast was 
contained and adhered to the PTBT however the peaceful nature of the explosion was 
contested internationally.42 The United States was harsh in its response, passing legislation 
that would limit aid to India and hamper any further attempts to develop the Indian nuclear 
program. The London Suppliers Group was also created in the wake of this test to further 
restrict the exchange of nuclear technology. The net effect was punishment, not just for 
India, but for Pakistan as well.43 In the end, the decision to test was considered to be built 
on the rationale of achieving international status and domestic self-respect.44 Notably, the 
opposition party of which future Prime Minister Vajpayee was a member, welcomed the 
test.45 This did not however mean that India had immediately usable nuclear weapons. The 
path to that ability is longer. India’s scientists would continue to improve its capabilities 
over the coming decades and would have more advanced designs ready to test in 1998.46  
                                                
40 Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II,” 151-55. 
41 Ibid, 155-59. 
42 Ibid, 160-61. 
43 Khan, Eating Grass, 121. 
44 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 178. 
45 Ibid, 179 
46 The account of this development is covered at length in George Perkovich’s India’s Nuclear Bomb 
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SIGNALS FROM PAKISTAN 
The story of the development of nuclear weapons in Pakistan is both astounding 
and troubling. The scientists, politicians, and military leaders involved showed great 
ingenuity and determination in this development. Less than three weeks after Pokhran-II, 
Pakistan conducted its own successful tests at Chagai on May 28th and 30th, 1998. The 
nation took pride in its ability to complete this task without help; this was their own 
success.47 Troubling is how its successes in nuclear technology were covertly proliferated 
outside of Pakistan via the network of Pakistani nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan.48 
India was aware that Pakistan could conceivably test a bomb within days of its own 
test as both countries had long been considered de facto nuclear weapons states. Each was 
thought to be capable of producing a useable weapon in a short time frame.49 Much like 
the Allied concern that Nazi Germany would develop a bomb first, the Indian government 
feared that Pakistan would induct its own nuclear weapons. In January of 1987,  A.Q. Khan 
commented to journalists50 that his country was already in the possession of a functional 
bomb. Additionally, Pakistan tested its Ghauri intermediate range missile on April 6th, 
1998 which further deepened India’s concern regarding the security of its neighborhood.51  
THE BJP COMES TO POWER 
March of 1998 represents a pivotal point in Indian politics as the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) came to power via a multi-stage election with Atal Bihari Vajpayee as its Prime 
Minister. Nuclear weapons were part of the party’s manifesto in that they promised to “re-
evaluate the country’s nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons” 
                                                
47 Khan, Eating Grass, 283. 
48 Ibid, 359-76. 
49 Rodney W. Jones et al., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1998), 111,131.  
50 Khan, Eating Grass, 225. 
51 Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II,” 170-71. 
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however the explicit intention to test was not explicated.52 Long a part of the BJP’s strategic 
culture, nuclear weapons were something that the BJP desired for India.53 This political 
change foregrounds the decision to test and put Prime Minister Vajpayee in the position to 
execute the test two months later.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
52 Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb (New York: Norton, 2007), 433,443. 
53 Kanti Bajpai, “The BJP and the Bomb,” In Inside Nuclear South Asia, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2009), 35-37.  
 17 
 Chapter Three: Testing and English Clarification 
THE TEST 
On the morning of May 11th, 1998 India executed nuclear tests in its western state 
of Rajasthan. Three devices of varying designs and yields were detonated. This test was 
primarily carried out under the supervision of scientists and not the military. Only a handful 
of individuals were aware of the test prior to its public announcement. Senior members of 
the Indian government and military were only informed hours before.54 Another two tests 
were conducted two days later on May 13th and no further tests have since been conducted. 
Unlike the response to British and French testing, the United States government openly 
condemned Pokhran-II. The Clinton Administration would pursue economic sanctions 
against India within days.55  
Figure 2: Pokhran Test Site Location in relation to New Delhi and Pakistan56 
 
 
 
 
THE MODELS OF SCOTT SAGAN AND MANJARI CHATTERJEE MILLER 
Before we look at English language statements, it is necessary to return to the 
theoretical models that could clarify the decision to test. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Scott 
Sagan proposes three models that motivate states to acquire nuclear weapons and Manjari 
                                                
54 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 416. 
55 Ibid, 420, 436. 
56 From Jones et al., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 126. Pokhran can be spelled Pokaran as per this 
illustration. The former was used throughout this report as it matched the spelling used by the Press 
Information Bureau of the Indian Government.    
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Chatterjee Miller added a fourth model to explain Pokhran-II specifically. Sagan’s three 
models are “security” from external threat, the interests of “domestic politics”, and a state 
viewing nuclear weapons as one of the “norms” that indicates its identity and modernity.57  
Miller’s model of “post-imperial ideology” posits that a state’s international actions are 
influenced by the trauma of colonial domination that manifests itself in present day 
victimhood and entitlement.58 In the case of Pokhran-II, she argues that a sense of 
victimhood at the hands of the international nonproliferation regime, coupled with the 
feeling that India was entitled to possess nuclear weapons, motivated India to test in 1998. 
In each of the statements in the next two chapters, the degree to which each of these 
models is reflected will be measured. These will be combined with elements of discourse 
from Chapter Two to illustrate what Prime Minister Vajpayee is advocating and which 
model is influencing that element of his argument. The assumption is made here that 
multiple models influenced the decision to test at Pokhran. 
 
INITIAL STATEMENT TO THE PRESS 
On May 11th, 1998 Prime Minister Vajpayee stood before the press in New Delhi 
and delivered a statement in English to announce the tests. The audience for this first 
release of information was both domestic and international and is recounted in its entirety 
in the figure below.  
                                                
57 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,” 55. 
58 Miller, Wronged by Empire, 2.  
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Figure 3: Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Statement on Pokhran-II59 
While this statement is brief it addresses the security, domestic politics, and norms 
models of choosing to build and test nuclear weapons. The phrase about the types of 
devices is reflective of the security model in that it indicates to external threats that India 
could now produce a low yield device which could feasibly be weaponized via a missile or 
carried by aircraft. Additionally, it indicated that they could produce a thermonuclear 
weapon,60 the most powerful type of nuclear device and capable of producing the most 
harm to an enemy. Next, the domestic politics model is addressed in referring to the 1974 
test, a reminder that the opposition party had once authorized a similar test. This is actually 
a denial of the domestic politics model, making it clear that both parties made the decision 
not of their own benefit but rather for the security of the nation.  Lastly, the norms model 
is addressed in the production of a thermonuclear device, in the contained nature of the 
explosion, and in the congratulations offered to the scientists and engineers. India, as a 
normative and fully modern state, would employ scientists and engineers with the capacity 
to produce the more complicated device while adhering to the Partial Test Ban Treaty 
which the state signed in 1963. The Prime Minister’s statement does not in any meaningful 
way reflect the post-imperial ideology model.  
                                                
59 Press Information Bureau Government of India. “Latest PIB Releases.” Accessed 29 October 2017. 
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr98/l0598/PIBR110598.html 
60 Often referred to as a Hydrogen bomb.  
Today at 1545 hrs., India conducted three underground nuclear tests 
in the Pokhran range. The test conducted today were with a fission 
device, a low yield device and a thermonuclear device. The 
measured yields are in line with expected values. Measurements 
have also confirmed that there was no release of radioactivity into 
the atmosphere. These were contained explosions like the 
experiment conducted in May 1974. I warmly congratulate the 
scientists and engineers who have carried out these successful tests.  
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MAY 11TH, 1998 OFFICIAL PRESS STATEMENT61 
The Prime Minister’s initial statement was quickly followed up by a press release 
from the Indian Government. It contains components that address each of the four models. 
Excerpts of this release will be parsed below.  
Figure 4: May 11th, 1998 Official Press Statement; Excerpt 1 
This excerpt noticeably reflects the security and norms models. Under the security 
model it announced to the world that India had a nuclear program with weapons capability 
and the intention to further develop deliverable bombs. Under the norms model it shows 
that India had professional scientific capability and this reinforced its identity as a modern 
state. 
Figure 5: May 11th, 1998 Official Press Statement; Excerpt 2 
                                                
61 Press Information Bureau Government of India. “Latest PIB Releases.” 
These tests have established that India has a proven capability for a 
weaponised nuclear programme. They also provide a valuable database 
which is useful in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields for 
different applications and for different delivery systems. Further, they are 
expected to carry Indian scientists towards a sound computer simulation 
capability which may be supported by sub-critical experiments if 
considered necessary. 
 
The Government is deeply concerned, as were previous 
Governments, about the nuclear environment in India's 
neighbourhood. These tests provide reassurance to the people of 
India that their national security interests are paramount and will be 
promoted and protected. Succeeding generations of Indians would 
also rest assured that contemporary technologies associated with 
nuclear option have been passed on to them in this the 50th year of 
our Independence. 
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This excerpt combines the security and domestic politics model. It specifically 
addressed potential nuclear threats that India sees in its immediate vicinity. This is 
unquestionably a reference to both Pakistan and China. Additionally, it also shows concern 
regarding cooperation between those undeclared and declared nuclear states on technical 
matters related to the bomb.62 The domestic politics model is also evident here as an appeal 
is made to the people of India and the security the tests promised. The BJP had intentions 
to solidify its hold on the government through the test as its victory in the March election 
placed it at the head of a coalition government, but without an outright majority.63  
Figure 6: May 11th, 1998 Official Press Statement; Excerpt 3 
In a final excerpt from this press statement, both the norms model and a small 
suggestion of the post-imperial ideology model are present. Its leadership in creating and 
adhering to efforts to curtail proliferation speaks to its identity as a modern and prominent 
state. The use of the term “nondiscriminatory” to describe a potential arrangement for 
disarmament evokes an Indian view of the existing nuclear club as being “unequal, unfair 
and racist”.64 
                                                
62 Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II,” 163. 
63 Kanti Bajpai, “The BJP and the Bomb,” 39-43. 
64 Miller, Wronged by Empire, 83. 
It is necessary to highlight today that India was in the vanguard of 
nations which ushered in the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 due to 
environmental concerns. Indian representatives have worked in 
various international forums, including the Conference on 
Disarmament, for universal, nondiscriminatory and verifiable 
arrangements for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. 
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Taken as a whole, the models that dominate this press statement are security and 
norms. Domestic politics is also acknowledged but there is only slight evidence of post-
imperial ideology prompting the decision to test.  
LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON 
On May 13th, 1998, The New York Times published a short letter written by Prime 
Minister Vajpayee to President Clinton. The letter sought to clarify why the tests were 
conducted and to ask for understanding. This document was leaked to the press and was 
subsequently scorned by members of Lok Sabha in a debate on May 29th.65 Excerpts are 
presented below. 
Figure 7: Letter to President Clinton; Excerpt 1 
In this first excerpt, the security model elaborated. Noticeably, the two states 
alluded to, China and Pakistan, are never mentioned by name. This will be consistent across 
all the English language statements consulted here. A reference to the four wars, three with 
Pakistan66 and one with China is utilized to frame the threat that India envisions.  
                                                
65“Further discussion on the statement made by the Prime Minister in the House on 27th May,1998 on the 
recent nuclear tests in Pokhran raised by Shri Indrajit Gupta on the 27th May, 98.” accessed September 29, 
2017. May 29, 1998. http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Debates/Result12.aspx?dbsl=157  
66 Wars between India and Pakistan occurred in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971.  
I have been deeply concerned at the deterioriating security environment, 
specially the nuclear environment, faced by India for some years past. We 
have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed 
armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that 
country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust 
persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust 
that country has materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a 
covert nuclear weapons state. At the hands of this bitter neighbor we have 
suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years.  
 
 23 
Figure 8: Letter to President Clinton; Excerpt 2 
In this next excerpt, the Prime Minister conforms to the norms models. He requests 
understanding based on India’s reputation as a responsible and cooperative state. He 
references India’s adherence to two conventions - the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Both seek to inhibit the 
proliferation of those types of weapons.67 Lastly, he once again uses the term non-
discriminatory to reference the type of agreements with which India is willing to engage. 
Here again there is just a subtle element of post-imperial ideology. The domestic politics 
model is not intimated in this letter.  
MAY 27TH, 1998 STATEMENT BY PRIME MINISTER68 
 16 days after the first test at Pokhran, Prime Minister Vajpayee delivered an English 
language statement in the Lok Sabha regarding the nuclear development. Before 
proceeding into excerpts from this speech it is worth pointing out an example of this 
statement being used to further an argument. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu has written a 
superb chapter entitled “India’s Nuclear Use Doctrine” which is part of a larger work 
entitled Planning the Unthinkable. He traces the development of the use doctrine for 
                                                
67 Jones et al., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 118. 
68“XII LOK SABHA DEBATES, Session II, (Budget).” accessed September 29, 2017, 
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/lsdeb/ls12/ses2/04270598.htm. 
We value our friendship and cooperation with your country and you 
personally. We hope that you will show understanding of our 
concern for India's security. I assure you that India will continue to 
work with your country in a multilateral or bilateral framework to 
promote the cause of nuclear disarmament. Our commitment to 
participate in non-discriminatory and verifiable global disarmament 
measures is amply demonstrated by our adherence to the two 
conventions on Biological and Chemical Weapons. 
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India’s newly created nuclear arsenal. Here the author uses two quotes69 from Prime 
Minister Vajpayee which are both from this statement. The quote he used to open the 
chapter is given below.  
Figure 9: May 27th Statement by Prime Minister; Excerpt 1 
This quotation is notable as it is the most representative of the post-imperial 
ideology model so far examined and its selection by Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu shows its 
importance. According to the statement the decision to test was built upon India’s due right. 
The immediate audience for this statement was the other members of the Lok Sabha and 
was the most domestically directed English statement of the group. 
Figure 10: May 27th Statement by Prime Minister; Excerpt 2 
This extract furthers the post-imperial ideology model argument. It references the 
previous normative efforts of India to curb nuclear proliferation and the failure of the 
international system to respond accordingly. It positions India as a victim forced to test 
because of the unfair policies of other states.  
                                                
69 Wahegru Pal Singh Sidhu, “India’s Nuclear Use Doctrine,” In Planning the Unthinkable, ed. Peter R. 
Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2000), 125-26. 
India is now a nuclear weapon state. This is a reality that cannot be 
denied.  It is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for 
others to grant. It is an endowment to the nation by our scientists 
and engineers. It is India's due, the right of one-sixth of humankind. 
We had taken a number of initiatives in the past. We regret that 
these proposals did not receive a positive response from other 
nuclear weapon states. In fact, had their response been positive, we 
need not have gone in for our current testing programme. 
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Figure 11: May 27th Statement by Prime Minister; Excerpt 3 
This is another example of denying that the domestic politics model was the 
impetus for testing. Like former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister Vajpayee 
claims to have taken the decision to test based on consideration of national security. In 
total, this statement before the Lok Sabha addressed all four of the models being evaluated 
but was the most first to significantly address post-imperial ideology.  
THE FIRST PART OF THE PICTURE 
The English language sources above identify several things. First, the most 
dominant models in these three statements are security and norms models. Domestic 
politics is mildly addressed in the form of denials and post-imperial ideology is even less 
prominent. As the Prime Minister’s audience skewed domestically he was more likely to 
make arguments that refuted the domestic politics model and display the influence of the 
post-imperial ideology model. The question that remains is whether the balance of 
emphasis will be the same in statements made in Hindi.  
 
 
 
 
 
The Lok Sabha debated the issue on 5th April, 1968. Prime Minister 
late Shrimati  Indira  Gandhi  assured  the  House  that  "we shall be 
guided entirely  by  our  self-enlightenment  and  the  considerations  
of   national security".  This was a turning point and this House 
strengthened the decision of the then Government by reflecting a 
national consensus. 
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Chapter Four: The Hindi Side of Clarification 
INTRODUCTION 
This section of the report will explore the other side of clarifying Pokhran-II. Here 
two debates will be consulted which occurred in the Lok Sabha where Prime Minister 
Vajpayee addressed the nuclear tests. These debates are multilinguistic settings in 
themselves. Many members speak in English and other speak using Indian languages such 
as Hindi. Notably in these two debates regarding the decision to test, Vajpayee uses Hindi 
to make his argument, often responding to questions and debate that were framed in 
English.  
ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE & HINDI 
Establishing Prime Minister Vajpayee’s status as a proficient Hindi speaker is 
perhaps best done through unconventional means.  A technical look at his speaking ability 
would be unfitting so rather this assessment should be made via an account featured in a 
glowing biography70, where his oratory skills have been described as containing 
“thoughtful content” and a certain “style of delivery”. His Hindi was described by 
journalist Mani Shankar Aiyar as “impeccable” and almost completely free of English 
words.71 In another account he was able to embarrass his Pakistani counterpart by speaking 
“chaste Urdu” at a banquet in Pakistan. In short, Vajpayee’s abilities in Hindi and even 
Hindustani are acknowledged as those of a skillful speaker.  
MAY 29TH, 1998 DEBATE IN THE LOK SABHA 
18 days after the first nuclear test in Pokhran, Prime Minister Vajpayee responded 
to debate regarding the statement he made on May 27th. In the interim, on May 28th, 
                                                
70 See Kingshuk Nag, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, A Man for All Seasons, (New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2016), 
86-87. 
71 Ibid, 87. 
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Pakistan conducted its first nuclear test. The debate opens with considerable discord in the 
audience. In the framework of the domestic politics model, several members accuse 
Vajpayee of choosing to test for political gain.72  The Prime Minister was the last to speak.  
Figure 12: May 29th, 1998, PM Vajpayee  Responds to Debate, Excerpt 173 
Here Prime Minister Vajpayee makes the claim against domestic politics 
influencing his decision to test by reminding his audience of the 1974 tests and the debate 
of that time. He references Indrajit Gupta, a fellow member of the Lok Sabha in 1974 and 
in 1998. He was the member who requested this debate and Vajpayee wishes to show how 
his own position is consistent and while it is the position of his opponents that has wavered.  
Figure 13: May 29th, 1998, PM Vajpayee Responds to Debate, Excerpt 274 
 
 
 
 
 
The security model is elicited in this phrase by showing that the external threat 
perceived from Pakistan was validated by the test. It is also noteworthy that this is the first 
time the name of Pakistan has actually been used. In previous phrasing in English it always 
                                                
72 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 423-24. 
73 “There is one thing that I am remembering about when there was a discussion on Pokhran-1. In 1974, at 
that time I was present in the discussion, Comrade Indrajit Gupta was also present, there are two other 
members which were also present, that are here today in parliament.”  
74 “Pakistan tested. No country can prepare to conduct nuclear tests in 15 days. This preparation went on 
for years.” 
BEò ¤ÉÉiÉ ¨ÉÖZÉä ªÉÉnù +É ®ú½þÒ ½þè VÉ¤É {ÉÉäJÉ®úhÉ `|ÉlÉ¨É' {É®ú SÉSÉÉÇ ½þÖ<Ç lÉÒ 
1974 ¨ÉäÆ, iÉÉä =ºÉ ºÉ¨ÉªÉ ¨ÉèÆ SÉSÉÉÇ ¨ÉäÆ ={ÉÊºlÉiÉ lÉÉ, EòÉ¨É®úäb÷ <xpùVÉÒiÉ 
MÉÖ{iÉ ¦ÉÒ ={ÉÊºlÉiÉ lÉä +Éè®ú ºÉÆºÉnù ¨ÉäÆ nùÉä ½þÒ ºÉnùºªÉ ½þèÆ VÉÉä =ºÉ ºÉ¨ÉªÉ 
¦ÉÒ ={ÉÊºlÉiÉ lÉä, +ÉVÉ ºÉnùxÉ ¨ÉäÆ ¨ÉÉèVÉÚnù ½þè Æ*  
{ÉÉÊEòºiÉÉxÉ xÉä {É®úÒIÉhÉ ÊEòªÉÉ*…	{Éxpù½þ ÊnùxÉ Eòä ¦ÉÒiÉ®ú EòÉä<Ç 
nùä¶É {É®ú¨ÉÉhÉÖ {É®úÒIÉhÉ EòÒ iÉèªÉÉ®úÒ xÉ½þÒÆ Eò®ú ºÉEòiÉÉ* þ ú 
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referred to by insinuation. China is also mentioned by name in other parts of the debate not 
cited here. 
 
 
Figure 14: May 29th, 1998, PM Vajpayee Responds to Debate, Excerpt 375 
Here Prime Minister Vajpayee makes reference to the determined sentiment of the 
scientists and military who toiled in the adverse conditions of the desert to make the test 
successful. There is a stylistic element to his phrasing; it is more colorful than anything 
seen in the English statements. It also supports the norms model because the struggle to 
accomplish this task is part of the country’s identity as nuclear state.  
Figure 15: May 29th, 1998, PM Vajpayee Responds to Debate, Excerpt 476 
The concept of discrimination is once against raised with this statement in regard 
to the nature of nonproliferation treaties. This conception is similar to the brief references 
seen in the May 11th press statement and the letter to President Clinton; however, there is 
                                                
75 “In the scorching sun of Pokhran, in the hot sand, in temperatures around 50 Celsius in which the 
scientists kept working, in which the soldiers kept working, in their mind there was only one feeling, and 
that one feeling is that the nation should be secure.”  
76 “They (the Great Powers) want to saddle the world with a discriminatory treaty, so after everyone saw it 
the decision was made. United together, the decision was made not to sign the CTBT.  
{ÉÉäJÉ®úhÉ EòÒ ÊSÉ±ÉÊSÉ±ÉÉiÉÒ vÉÚ{É ¨ÉäÆ, MÉ¨ÉÇ ¤ÉÉ±ÉÚ ¨ÉäÆ, {ÉSÉÉºÉ Eòä Eò®úÒ¤É 
]õä¨ |ÉäSÉ®ú ¨ÉäÆ VÉÉä ´ÉèYÉÉÊxÉEò EòÉ¨É Eò®úiÉä ®ú½þä Æ, VÉÉä VÉ´ÉÉxÉ EòÉ¨É Eò®úiÉä ®ú½þä, 
=xÉEòä ¨ÉxÉ ¨ÉäÆ BEò ½þÒ ¦ÉÉ´ÉxÉÉ lÉÒ +Éè®ú BEò ½þÒ ¦ÉÉ´ÉxÉÉ ½þè ÊEò nùä¶É EòÒ 
®úIÉÉ ½þÉäxÉÒ SÉÉÊ½þB* 
´Éä (¨É½þÉ¶ÉÊEiÉªÉÉÆ) ¦Éänù¦ÉÉ´É{ÉÚhÉÇ ºÉÆÊvÉ EòÉä nùÖÊxÉªÉÉ {É®ú ±ÉÉnùxÉÉ SÉÉ½þiÉä ½þèÆ, 
iÉÉä ºÉ¤ÉxÉä Ê¨É±É Eò®ú ¡òèºÉ±ÉÉ ÊEòªÉÉ, <Eò_ä ¡òèºÉ±ÉÉ ÊEòªÉÉ ÊEò CTBT 
{É®ú ½þºiÉÉIÉ®ú xÉ½þÒÆ Eò®úäÆMÉä* 
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a difference from those English languages sources.  This is the first time that agency is 
given to the parties responsible for the discrimination - the great powers of the existing 
nuclear club. This is the type of victimhood that Manjari Chatterjee Miller envisions 
motivating the decision to test via post-imperial ideology. 
Figure 16: May 29th, 1998, PM Vajpayee Responds to Debate, Excerpt 577 
This excerpt highlights the frustration India has with the international non-
proliferation regime. India has often seen the NPT and CTBT as unequal.78 Under these 
treaties the existing nuclear club would be able to maintain their monopoly on nuclear 
weapons while also gaining the ability to penalize those countries who were on the outside. 
In this arrangement, India was the victim and the great powers were the victimizers. In 
total, these five excerpts from May 29th display all four of the models that could explain 
the desire for nuclear weapons. Substantially, this is first time that the post-imperial 
ideology model is elaborated. Also, Pakistan and China are mentioned by name and the 
tone becomes more emotional and stylistic. 
 
APRIL 17TH, 1999 DEBATE IN THE LOK SABHA 
Nearly a year after the test of Pokhran-II, Prime Minister Vajpayee once again 
engaged the topic in the Lok Sabha. He did so as he faced an impending motion of 
                                                
77 “When we do nuclear testing and when we meet with other countries on the matter of nuclear testing we 
raise our voice and to the major power nations we say, you, please destroy your own weapons.”  
78 Miller, Wronged By Empire, 83. 
½þ¨É VÉ¤É +hÉÖ {É®úÒIÉhÉ Eò®úiÉä ½þèÆ +Éè®ú +hÉÖ {É®úÒIÉhÉ Eòä ¨ÉÉ¨É±Éä ¨ÉäÆ VÉ¤É 
+xªÉ nùä¶ÉÉäÆ Eòä ºÉÉlÉ Ê¨É±ÉEò®ú +É´ÉÉVÉ =`öÉiÉä ½þ èÆ +Éè®ú ¨É½þÉ-nùä¶ÉÉäÆ EòÉä 
Eò½þiÉä ½þè Æ ÊEò +É{É +{ÉxÉä +ºjÉ xÉ¹]õ EòÊ®úªÉä* 
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confidence for his government which would be lost by the end of the day. Below are 
portions of that speech that are relevant to his discussion regarding the previous year’s 
nuclear test. 
Figure 17: April 17th, 1999, PM Vajpayee Responds to Motion, Excerpts79 
These excerpts once again show elements of all four explanatory models. An 
attempt is made to dispel both the domestic politics and norms models while the security 
model is made central in his arguments for why the decision was made. The post-imperial 
                                                
79 -“We were in the opposition yet we welcomed it because it was for the security of the country.” 
- “Yes or no, in the matter of security shouldn’t we be self-dependent? There isn’t just one neighbor, we 
have several neighbors.” 
-“The Pokhran-II test wasn’t for self-congratulation.  It was not for displaying manliness, but our policy is 
[...], and I understand that the policy of the country continues to be that there should be a minimum 
deterrent”. 
-“In the 13 months of our tenure we have not made any decision under international pressure, nor will we.” 
-½þ¨É |ÉÊiÉ{ÉIÉ ¨ÉäÆ lÉä Ê¡ò®ú ¦ÉÒ º´ÉÉMÉiÉ ÊEòªÉÉ lÉÉ EªÉÉäÆÊEò ´É½þ nùä¶É EòÒ 
®úIÉÉ Eòä Ê±ÉB ÊEòªÉÉ MÉªÉÉ lÉÉ* […] 
 
-EªÉÉ ®úIÉÉ Eòä ¨ÉÉ¨É±Éä ¨ÉäÆ ½þ¨ÉäÆ +Éi¨ÉÊxÉ¦ÉÇ®ú xÉ½þÒÆ ½þÉäxÉÉ SÉÉÊ½þB? Eòä´ É±É 
BEò {Éc÷ÉäºÉÒ xÉ½þÒÆ, ½þ¨ÉÉ®úä +xÉäEò {Éc÷ÉäºÉÒ ½þèÆ* […] 
 
-{ÉÉäJÉ®úhÉ-II ]õèº]õ EòÉä<Ç +Éi¨É-¶±ÉÉJÉÉ Eòä Ê±ÉB xÉ½þÒÆ lÉÉ* ´É½þ EòÉä<Ç 
{ÉÖ¯ û¹ÉÉlÉÇ Eòä |ÉEò]õÒEò®úhÉ Eòä Ê±ÉB xÉ½þÒÆ lÉÉ, ±ÉäÊEòxÉ ½þ¨ÉÉ®úÒ xÉÒÊiÉ ½þè +Éè®ú 
¨ÉèÆ ºÉ¨ÉZÉiÉÉ ½þÚÆ ÊEò ªÉ½þ nùä¶É EòÒ xÉÒÊiÉ ®ú½þÒ ½þè ÊEò Ê¨ÉÊxÉ¨É¨É Êb÷]õ®úäÆ]õ ½þÉäxÉÉ 
SÉÉÊ½þB* […] 
 
-13 ¨É½þÒxÉä Eòä +{ÉxÉä EòÉªÉÇEòÉ±É ¨ÉäÆ Eò¦ÉÒ ½þ¨ÉxÉä +ÆiÉ®ú®úÉ¹]ÅÒªÉ nù¤ÉÉ´É ¨ÉäÆ 
+ÉEò®ú EòÉä<Ç ¡òèºÉ±ÉÉ xÉ½þÒÆ ÊEòªÉÉ, xÉ +ÉMÉä Eò®úäÆMÉä! […]  
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ideology model is also present in his exclamation that his government would refuse to 
allow India to bow to international pressure and thus become victims of the unfair non-
proliferation regimes. In available video of the speech he delivers this line with additional 
emphasis and emotion.  
THE SECOND PART OF THE PICTURE 
The Hindi side of the argument from Prime Minister Vajpayee has been 
complementary in clarifying the rationale for why India tested nuclear weapons in 1998. 
All four models that explain why states build nuclear weapons are present. Efforts are made 
to dispel the notion that the compulsions of domestic politics or the pursuit of certain 
identities were the dominating motivation. Vajpayee makes it clear that it was the security 
calculus, specifically the external threats in the region, that prompted his decision to test. 
Sentiments that would corroborate post-imperial ideology as the motivation to test are also 
extant and expressed openly. 
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Chapter Five: Postscript, Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
POSTSCRIPT 
There is a noteworthy speech80 from 2005 that offers a retrospective look at the 
period of Pokhran-II. On the May 11th anniversary of the tests, former Prime Minister 
Vajpayee addressed attendees at a function planned by the BJP. In clear terms and in 
English he openly made the case that India saw the nonproliferation regime of the 
international community as being unbalanced and unequal. He stated, “to safeguard our 
national interest, to serve the needs of national security, and to reject the notion that it is 
the security of only some in the world that was important and all others were irrelevant, we 
had to boldly and resolutely assert the autonomy of our decision making.” In total, the 
speech reified his explications of 1998 and 1999. He placed pursuit of national security as 
the central rationale for conducting the test while showing the influence of post-imperial 
ideology. India had rejected the international community’s discourse. It would not be a 
victim and was entitled to take the necessary steps to ensure its security.  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
This report used the models of Scott Sagan and Manjari Chatterjee Miller to frame 
the argument that a full clarification of Pokhran-II could only come through consultations 
with both English and Hindi statements. At no point did Prime Minister Vajpayee 
contradict himself between the statements but there were differences in emphasis and tone. 
The most striking difference between the two sets of statements is the degree to which each 
emphasized different models for understanding why nuclear weapons were pursued and 
                                                
80 “Pokhran: Today’s Perspectives.” accessed September 29, 2017. May 11, 2005. 
http://www.bjp.org/media-resources/speeches/shri-atal-bihari-vajpayee-speech-on-pokhran-today-s-
perspectives. 
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tested. Miller’s argument that only post-imperial ideology could explain the decision to test 
in 1998 is bolstered by the findings of this report.81 In short, the influence of victimhood 
and the feeling of entitlement due to colonial trauma were only fully evident when the 
Hindi statements were parsed. There were also differences in emotion and style. The Hindi 
statements contained elements that were more expressive and more personal in tone. The 
most reasonable explanation for these differences is Vajpayee’s understanding of his 
audience. He was aware that invoking India’s sense of victimhood at the hands of the 
international non-proliferation regime was effective for explaining his decision to the 
domestic audience of parliamentary debate. Conversely, he understood that an international 
audience would not find those same elements of post-imperial ideology as meaningful 
explanations for Pokhran-II. Making those arguments in English and with a passionate tone 
may have been counterproductive for his political goals. The larger question raised in this 
report was not whether the audience mediated expression, rather it asked whether there 
were differences across the English-Hindi divide of the multilinguistic setting of Pokhran-
II. In summation, there was a difference, and thus the clarification of the test was more 
complete when both languages were consulted. 
In this report, it was important to use Sagan and Miller’s models or a similar 
framework as doing so without would have negated the ability to sort and classify the 
compulsions facing Prime Minister Vajpayee. It is worth assuming that an alternative 
framework, as long as it facilitated the classification of motivations, could have shown a 
similar result.  
The inferences that can be made from the findings of this report are somewhat 
broader than the immediate case of Pokhran-II. Events occur daily in multilinguistic 
                                                
81 Miller, Wronged by Empire, 26. 
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settings and parties in other locations attempt to understand what occurred and why. Often 
these narratives are reframed into mono-linguistic statements, news reports, and other 
mediums. These mediums will always provide a picture of what happened but, as these 
findings on Pokhran-II show, sometimes that picture is incomplete. In some cases, a key 
player will clarify their position with a tailored focus for different audiences. For those who 
seek to clarify future events that occur in multilinguistic settings, it is recommended to 
consult sources in all the languages that constitute the setting of the original event. This 
lesson is particularly salient when looking to clarify events in India and South Asia more 
generally. The multilinguistic settings of these regions are fertile ground for variations in 
emphasis and focus between sources.  
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